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Abstract: This research compares the performance of female and male 
entrepreneurs in a microenterprise credit program in Guatemala.  Previous research 
and field practice has suggested that targeting credit at female borrowers allows for 
more substantial increases in household welfare, but that male entrepreneurs may 
more aggressively expand enterprises when given access to credit. In this paper, we 
develop a model that shows that increases in value of home time during 
childbearing years for women may substantially account for gender differences in 
responses to credit access.  Empirical results from Guatemalan survey data yield 
estimations consistent with the predictions from our model.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 The last two decades have witnessed an astounding proliferation of microenterprise 
credit programs throughout the developing world.  In the coming years, the number and scope 
of such programs will greatly increase.   As development policy makers and the poor alike 
have become weary of costly and wasteful large-scale development projects, microenterprise 
finance has rapidly emerged as a primary tool for alleviating world poverty. The success of 
the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh and the ACCION-affiliated credit programs in Latin 
America richly illustrate how the productivity of the poor in less developed countries can be 
unleashed through millions of small injections of credit.   
 Providing credit to the poor serves a dual purpose.  As borrowed capital is invested in 
a small enterprise, it often results in significant short-term increase in household expenditure 
and welfare (Pitt and Khandker, 1998).  However, a second goal of microenterprise credit 
programs is to spur economic growth in the informal sector through fostering increased 
capitalization of businesses, employment creation, and long-term income growth.  This paper 
examines the possible trade-off between these goals, especially as they relate to the 
increasing practice of targeting credit at female entrepreneurs. 
 A large and growing number of recipients of microenterprise credit are women.  For 
example, female entrepreneurs comprise 93 percent of the Grameen Bank's current portfolio 
of 1.2 million borrowers, an increase from 39 percent in the early 1980s. Female 
entrepreneurs regularly make up greater than half of borrowers in ACCION-affiliated credit 
programs in Latin America, and the share of female borrowers has continued to grow over 
time (Inter-American Development Bank, 1997).   
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 There are several important reasons for the dramatic increase in credit targeted at 
female entrepreneurs in developing countries.  The first is the increasing proportion of 
women in both developed and developing countries involved in entrepreneurial activity.  In 
Canada, for example, the number of female entrepreneurs tripled between 1976 and 1994 
(Cohen, 1996), such that today women account for one in three entrepreneurs in the Canadian 
economy.  Tokman (1989) describes the increasing "feminization" of the self-employed 
informal sector in Latin American countries in recent decades.  Berger (1989) estimates that 
women own or operate roughly one-third of all informal sector businesses, though of course 
data on women's self-employment is notoriously poor in developing countries.  Most likely 
the share of women in informal business has increased dramatically in recent decades.  
Reasons for the feminization of informal sector include the limited absorptive capacity and 
difficulty of entry into the formal sector for women, macroeconomic dislocation and 
adjustment (especially during the 1980s), and changes in household gender norms.  All of 
these factors have led to a growing percentage of households worldwide that are supported 
solely by women (Berger, 1989; Clark, 1991). 
 A second explanation for the rising proportion of female borrowers in credit programs 
is that, along with issues of economic growth, the NGO-dominated microenterprise credit 
industry has often specifically sought to address issues of women's empowerment in 
developing countries.  Much recent research has shown that access to credit generates a form 
of economic empowerment which can greatly enhance a woman's self-esteem and status 
within the family (Goetz and Gupta, 1995).  Separate empirical studies by Hashemi et al. 
(1996) and Amin et al. (1998) have explored the relationship between women's 
empowerment and participation in microcredit programs.  Using  empowerment indices such 
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as a women's independent decision-making ability within the household, freedom from 
restrictions on daily activity, and increased authority and household decision-making, the 
studies find that women in Bangladesh with access to credit score higher than women without 
credit access, even after controlling for self-selection effects. 
 In addition, many NGOs and other development institutions prefer to direct credit 
toward women since studies show that when credit is given to women, it has a greater impact 
on household welfare than credit directed toward male borrowers.   Jiggins (1989), for 
example, portrays the female enterprise as an institution whose primary purpose is to ensure 
subsistence consumption for members of the household, in contrast to male enterprises, in 
which returns are often higher, but more risky.  McKee (1989) and Downing (1990) note the 
strong relationship that typically exists between a woman's entrepreneurial income and family 
welfare, revealing that women have a particular propensity to redirect earnings from a 
microenterprise to household and children's needs. Pitt and Khandker (1998) show, in a 
sample of poor households in Bangladesh, that household consumption expenditure increased 
18 taka for every 100 additional taka borrowed by women while the increase was only 11 
taka for every 100 taka borrowed by men.  They also find that credit for women had a 
positive effect on both girls and boys schooling. 
 An important question, however, is whether this increase in household welfare comes 
at the expense of economic growth.  If so, then targeting credit at women in developing 
countries may embody a trade-off of long-term economic growth for poverty alleviation, and 
more immediate improvements in welfare.   McKee (1989) argues that "... micro-
entrepreneurs are often seeking modest improvements in the stability and level of their 
earnings, and do not necessarily give high priority to business expansion through 
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reinvestment of profits at the expense of consumption.  Women in particular, may prefer to 
allocate earnings to improve housing or their children's education." 
 There is currently a heated debate in the literature over whether this trade-off exists.  
Downing (1990) describes gender differences in investment behavior: while male borrowers 
tend to invest in a single relatively high-yielding project, women tend to diversify their 
entrepreneurial activity to guarantee a subsistence level of household income. Studies such as 
Matienzo (1993) show significantly higher rates of return on capital and enterprise expansion 
by male borrowers.  Yet, some such as Clark (1991) assert that "women who do have access 
to the benefits of microenterprise assistance programs perform as well as or better than their 
male counterparts in generating employment and operating their businesses."  Other studies 
such as Blumberg (1989) are more critical of male entrepreneurs, arguing that men have a 
higher propensity to spend earned income on clothing and entertainment for themselves while 
women have a tendency to invest their earnings in the food, clothing, and human capital of 
their children.  This debate spills over into the discussion over microenterprise sustainability 
(see Mosley and Hulme 1998, and Morduch 1998): Does targeting lending to the very poor 
preclude full cost-recovery because the returns on their projects are too low to repay high 
interest rates? 
 This paper seeks to contribute to this debate in two ways.  In Section II we present a 
simple model of a household enterprise, which is intended to clarify potential differences in 
male and female entrepreneurial behavior, particularly in terms of their responsiveness to 
credit.  Predictions from the model show that differences in the entrepreneurial behavior 
between men and women may stem from differences in initial scales of production, labor 
supervision costs, and differences in the marginal value of home time relative to the marginal 
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value of income.  In Section III of the paper we then compare the insights of the model with 
data from an ACCION-affiliated credit institution in Guatemala.  We perform estimations on 
first-hand survey data of 342 entrepreneurs in western Guatemala.  Our results show that 
while there are significant differences between female and male-owned enterprises in terms 
of employment generation, female entrepreneurs overall show little statistically significant 
difference from their male counterparts in their ability to generate increases in sales.  The 
differences that do exist in employment generation seem to be mainly attributed to the time 
constraints placed on women during childbearing and childrasing years.  Section IV offers a 
summary of the results of the paper and policy implications for field practice.  
 
2. A SIMPLE MODEL OF A HOUSEHOLD ENTERPRISE 
 
Consider a model of a household enterprise for which there are three inputs: capital, hired 
labor, and an entrepreneur's own labor.  The entrepreneur (male or female) is faced with two 
constraints: a time constraint equal to unity (the waking hours of a single day), and a working 
capital constraint equal to Ω .  The entrepreneur faces cost outlays of r per unit of employed 
capital, K, and a wage for each unit of hired labor, L, also set equal to one.  The 
entrepreneur’s time can be spent in home activity, m, self-employed labor, l , and labor 
supervision in the amount of ( )1 ,0∈s  per unit of employed labor, L, so that 1=++ sLm l .  
We will assume that the entrepreneur’s utility function has arguments in both net income 
(enterprise output minus rental payments and wages),Φ , and home activity, m.  We also 
assume that capital makes own and hired labor more productive, and that there are 
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diminishing returns to increases in a single input and to home activity, Specifically, 
.0 and ,0 ,0 ,0 11221112 <<Φ<Φ>Φ h  The entrepreneur thus faces the maximization problem 
  ( ) ( ) ( )LrKLrKsLhLK
,λK,L,
−−Ω+−−−−++Φ= λll
l
1,  Zmax  
with first order conditions given in (1-4): 
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Our purpose is to focus on the insights that the model provides into differences in 
behavior of female in male entrepreneurs. We do this by first making some general 
assumptions about gender asymmetries in traditional societies.  Using the model, we then see 
how these general assumptions about behavior translate into specific differences between 
behavior of male and female entrepreneurs.  We will concern ourselves with how important 
gender asymmetries affect two measures of enterprise growth: increases in hired labor and 
increases in gross income (sales) in the household enterprise.  These measures of growth are 
of primary concern to NGOs operating credit programs in developing countries because they 
are closely related to the commonly articulated goals of economic growth and poverty 
reduction, respectively. 
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In nearly all developing countries, male and female entrepreneurs differ substantially 
in their access to credit. While credit access is notoriously poor in the informal sector in 
developing countries even for male entrepreneurs, in the absence of intervention in credit 
markets, access to credit is particularly poor for women (Jiggins, 1989; World Bank, 1989; 
Clark, 1991).  This creates a substantial restriction on the size of many female enterprises.  In 
the first-order conditions given in (1) and (2), λ represents the shadow value of working 
capital to the household enterprise.  As seen in (1) and (2), as the shadow value of working 
capital increases for women, the equilibrium level of capitalization and hired labor in the 
female informal sector enterprise declines. This may help explain the vast number of female 
household enterprises in developing countries that are operated solely through self-employed 
female labor. 
 Even apart from the central issue of credit access, there are other important gender 
asymmetries that may have important effects on the size and growth of female enterprises.  In 
traditional societies, the marginal value of home activity is routinely higher for women than 
for men, especially at low levels of m.  Norms in traditional societies often dictate that 
women be the primary caregivers to children, having primary responsibility for preparation of 
meals, and household chores.  This renders the function ( )⋅′h  quite steep at low levels of m 
for females relative to males in most developing country households, however the value of 
this function will be influenced by social norms (see Kevane and Wydick, 2001).  The 
extreme case of ( ) ∞=⋅′h , would imply a constraint against female entrepreneurship. A 
"flatter" ( )⋅h  function, more likely in the case of male household heads, allows for more 
substitutability between home and work time. 
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 We can use the first-order conditions of the model to look at the impact of differences 
in the value of home time between female on male enterprises ex ante to credit provision.  
The marginal value of home time enters the first-order conditions in (2) and (3), governing 
the optimal allocation of own labor and hired labor within the enterprise, respectively.  In 
both instances, a higher marginal value of home time for women implies that female 
enterprises will utilize less own labor and less hired labor, and are therefore likely to be 
smaller than those operated by male entrepreneurs.  This is consistent with the descriptive 
data from the Guatemalan survey presented in Table 1.  Female enterprises have a mean of 
0.73 employees before credit access compared to a mean of 1.02 for male enterprises.   
 A third asymmetry between male and female entrepreneurs in traditional societies are 
societal norms that may make it more difficult for women to act as supervisors of hired labor.  
These norms may make it particularly difficult for women to hire and supervise male 
workers.  The inability, or at least reluctance, of a female entrepreneur to discipline a 
negligent male employee may lead to moral hazard problems in the workplace.  Adding 
additional workers to an enterprise, especially after a certain level, often begins to tax the 
management skills of less-educated entrepreneurs in the informal sector.  Women, often at a 
disadvantage with respect to men in terms of education and leadership experience, may 
consequently face disadvantages in worker supervision.  As seen in (2), a greater cost of 
supervision, s, for women constrains the equilibrium size of women’s enterprises. 
 We now examine changes in the household enterprise that come as a result of access 
to credit.  Totally differentiating equations (1-4) yields the following set of equations given in 
matrix notation: 
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Defining the 4x4 matrix in (1’-4’) as A, we find through Laplace expansion that the 
determinant of A  is negative, given the standard assumptions that 012122211 >ΦΦ−ΦΦ .  
Using Cramer’s rule, we can calculate the effect of improved access to credit on employment 
creation within the household enterprise.  Modeling increased credit access as a relaxation of 
the credit constraint, dividing (1’-4’) by Ωd , and solving for 
Ω∂
∂L
, we find that  
(5)   ( )[ ] 011 112111112212211 >Φ−−Φ+Φ−ΦΦ⋅−=Ω hsrhA
L
∂
∂
, 
or that hired labor increases in an enterprise with expanded access to credit.  Equation (5), 
however, also reveals the effect of the marginal value of home activity on enterprise 
employment.  If the function h reflecting the utility of home activity displays minimal 
concavity (“a woman’s chores are never done”), then h11 is close to zero, and the effect of 
better credit access on generating employment in female enterprises is significantly reduced 
by the last two terms in (5).   Conversely, when the h function is highly concave, h11 is large, 
and this reflects a limit to a woman’s duties at home.  As seen in (5) when h11 is large, this 
amplifies the effect of access to credit on employment creation.   From (5) we can also show 
that 0
2
<
∂Ω∂
∂
s
L
, implying that if female entrepreneurs face higher supervision costs, the 
impact of access to credit on employment generation is smaller. 
  The model also yields an expression for the direct effect of access to credit on gross 
sales (a key variable in the Guatemalan survey data). Using Cramer’s rule as in (5), it is also 
 10 
straightforward to show that 0>
Ω∂
∂K
 and that 0>
Ω∂
∂l
.  Thus we know that the change in 
gross income with a small increase in credit access given in (6) is unambiguously positive 
when the credit constraint is binding, or  
(6)   021 >


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Note that the impact of access to credit on gross income is similar to the impact on 
employment generation: positive, yet high supervision costs will dampen the positive effect 
of increased credit access ( 0
2
<
∂Ω∂
Φ∂
s
).  We now compare the predictions of the model with 
the Guatemalan data.  
 
3. EMPIRICAL RESULTS FROM GUATEMALAN DATA 
 The Guatemalan data is taken from a 1994 survey of 358 entrepreneurs in western 
Guatemala.  The current study utilizes information from 342 of these entrepreneurs for whom 
appropriate data for this study was available. The sample is composed of 260 borrowers of 
FUNDAP, an ACCION-affiliated microenterprise lending institution which began lending in 
the region in 1988, and 82 entrepreneurs displaying very similar characteristics to the 
FUNDAP borrowers, but who were located in areas just outside the reach of FUNDAP's 
credit program.   Thus the 82 non-FUNDAP entrepreneurs serve as a control group. 
 Each entrepreneur was a member of a borrowing group consisting of three to six 
members.  The 260 FUNDAP borrowers belonged to 137 borrowing groups, 76 of which 
were male borrowing groups, 14 of which were female borrowing groups, and 47 of which 
were mixed-gender groups.  Table 1 provides statistics on the management of borrowed 
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capital within the group, propensity of mutual financial assistance within the group in 
repayment of loans, and the average number of days late with payments in the groups history 
of a typical (3-month) loan. (Insert Table 1 here.) Gender differences between borrowing 
groups are interesting: female borrowing groups displayed the fewest instances of misuse of 
funds, but in female groups less mutual financial assistance was given among group members 
in repaying loans.  Overall, the lower instances of moral hazard allowed female groups to 
outperform the male borrowing groups, averaging nearly one day per loan less in arrears than 
their male counterparts.  Performance was worst among the mixed-gender groups.  As seen in 
Table 1 instances of misuse of funds were highest in mixed-gender groups, intra-group 
financial assistance was lowest, and mixed-gender groups ranked last in arrears performance.  
These data indicate that female entrepreneurs are at least as capable at managing credit as 
their male counterparts, if not more so. (Insert Table 2 here.) Table 2 gives logit estimations 
similar to those contained in Wydick (1999), which, controlling for a host of other group 
characteristics, show very little statistically significant difference in the performance of male 
and female borrowing groups, except that the male groups appear to provide more intra-group 
insurance. 
 We turn now to the discussion of the effects of the credit program on employment 
and sales.  Descriptive statistics and definitions of variables for the 358 entrepreneurs are 
given in Table 3. (Insert Table 3 here.)  Most interesting are the differences between the 
94 female entrepreneurs and the 264 male entrepreneurs.  The average age of the women 
included in the survey is nearly equal to that of the men, 37.0 years and 35.9 years, 
respectively.  Interestingly, the female entrepreneurs in the sample are slightly more 
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educated than the male entrepreneurs; the average number of years of formal education for 
women being 4.38, while for men it is 3.63. 
 Female entrepreneurs tended to be more heavily located in the urban areas and were 
somewhat less likely to be engaged in manufacturing activity than the male entrepreneurs (i.e. 
more likely to be engaged in retail trade). The average years of credit access to the sample 
was also nearly identical, just over two years.  The average initial loan size for male 
borrowers (1132 quetzales) was larger than the average initial female loan (781 quetzales), 
and this difference persisted such that current loans sizes among borrowers were also quite 
different, with 2082 quetzales for men and 1493 quetzales for women (the exchange rate 
during this period was roughly 5.5 quetzales per US dollar).  As mentioned previously, the 
number of hired laborers in the female enterprises is significantly smaller than the number in 
male enterprises.  Before credit, the average number of employees in a female entrepreneur's 
enterprise was 0.69 compared to 1.06 within a male entrepreneur's enterprise. The absolute 
change in employment (after receiving access to credit) is also about two-thirds as much for 
women; but the percentage changes in employment are roughly equal (about 70%).  Initial 
levels of sales are similar between men and women, while the percent change in sales is 
lower for women (60% versus 75%). 
One problem endemic to this kind of study is that of selection bias, i.e. that borrowers 
in the credit program may share unobservable personal characteristics which are different 
than those of the control group. While it is impossible to create a perfect control group based 
on unobservables, the observable characteristics of the control group were extremely close to 
those of program participants.  In both the treatment and control groups, the average age was 
approximately 36 years old. Female entrepreneurs made up approximately one fourth of both 
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program participants and the control group.  Mean monthly sales were US$371 for program 
participants and were US$432 for members of the control group three years before the 
survey.  Mean years of formal education were 3.26 and 4.86 years for program participants 
and the control group, respectively.  Thus the control group, selected from areas not yet 
targeted by the program, was perhaps slightly more educated with slightly larger enterprises.  
 Table 4 presents results from five estimations that explore the determinants of change 
in employment in microenterprises. (Insert Table 4 here.)  The dependent variable is the 
difference between current employment and previous employment.  A tobit procedure is used 
since approximately 30% of the entrepreneurs experienced no change in employment, 
creating a truncation in the distribution of the dependent variable.  (We also estimated the 
equations using a Poisson maximum-likelihood regression and using ordered-probit, both 
reflecting the integer nature of the data , i.e. number of employees rather than hours worked.  
The other techniques yielded essentially similar results.)  Simple Chow tests on OLS 
specifications suggest that specification (1) is better than separating the sample by gender, but 
that separating is better for differentiating between small-scale producers productores (e.g. 
handicrafts, candles) and retail traders known as comerciantes.  We have chosen to present 
various pooled and separated results, and in column (4) the pooled regressions with gender 
dummies.   (For retail traders no variables are significant, so we do not present separate 
results for them.) 
 One special feature of the sample, that makes assessment of the effects of credit less 
than straightforward, is that survey data for borrowers in the credit program yielded before 
and after changes with respect to when they joined the credit program.  Among program 
participants, 79 had been in the program one year or less, 89 for two years, 44 for three years, 
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23 for four years, and 14 for five or more years; with the average being 2.32.  For the control 
group, the survey attempted to capture changes in variables over the previous three years. 
Thus, the time frame for before-after comparisons differs among respondents.  Entrepreneurs 
who had received credit for n years reported on employment and sales changes over that n-
year period, while the control group reported changes in employment over three years.  We 
control for these differences in ‘cohorts’ with the variable TIME, that varies from 0.1 to 6 
(for those who joined one month previously to those who joined six years previously).  The 
TIME variable captures any secular trend in the overall economic environment.  During the 
period considered, 1988-1993, the economy of Guatemala was relatively stable, displaying 
only moderate growth.  We would expect then to find that employment and sales grew more 
for those reporting growth over a longer period.  As the table shows, TIME is positive and 
often significant in the various specifications; the longer the time between the current period 
and the reference period for previous employment, the larger is growth in employment.   
 We do not transform the growth numbers into annual growth rates, because the effects 
of credit may be felt most in the first year of credit provision and less thereafter, i.e. the 
relation is non-linear.  We capture this by including a squared term TIMESQCR.  While this 
variable is insignificant in most regressions (and hence dropped), it does turn out to be 
important for productores, and so we include it in that regression.  The sign is negative, as 
expected; all else equal, longer time in the credit program (after the first year or two) does not 
continue to generate large increases in employment. 
 The key variables in these estimations are CRED, a dummy taking a value one if the 
entrepreneur was a member of the credit program, CREDFEM, in which a dummy taking the 
value of one for female entrepreneurs is interacted with CRED, and AGEFEM, which 
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interacts the female dummy with the age of the entrepreneur.  CRED is uniformly positive 
and highly significant. Regarding gender differences in employment generation, Table 4 
shows that female entrepreneurs in general are less likely to see employment growth; the 
effect on FEM is large, significant, and negative (particularly so for productores). AGEFEM 
is significant and positive, revealing that older female entrepreneurs realize more 
employment growth in their enterprises than younger female entrepreneurs.  
 A comparison of the credit program effects by age for men and for women can be 
seen in Figure 1. (Insert Figure 1 here.)  These figures contain the predicted increases in 
employment generated from the tobit estimation (4) in Table 4.   The estimations generate 
predictions of the number of employees in an enterprise given the censored distribution of the 
dependent variable (see Maddala (1983) p. 159).   The expression used to generate the 
predictions from our model is given by 
(7)     ( ) λy i σ+′= xβΛE  
where y is the change in employment within an enterprise, Λ  and λ in (7) represent, 
respectively, the normal distribution and density functions evaluated at their sample means, 
β ′  is the vector of tobit-estimated coefficients, x  is the vector of sample means of 
independent variables (except for age which is varied across ages 20 to 64 and dummy 
variables which take values of 0 and 1 where appropriate), and σ  is the standard error of the 
estimation.   
Figure 1 uses the estimations in Table 4 column 4 to show the predicted differences in 
increases in employment for participants and non-participants in the credit program by 
gender.  First note that for non-participants the predicted number of employees added to 
enterprises is greater for male than for female entrepreneurs at every age level of the 
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entrepreneur.  However, for credit program participants, these differences change 
dramatically.  Holding all other variables constant at the sample means, predicted 
employment generation for female borrowers in childbearing years (generally through the 
20’s for Guatemalan women) is significantly lower than that for men.  However, the 
predicted number of added employees for female entrepreneurs in the credit program 
continues to increase for women until it peaks at age 42, while the figure for men peaks at 
age 30.  After age 33, the predicted number of employees added for women actually passes 
that for the men, reaching a peak of 1.01 employees added at age 42 and then slowly 
declining.  
A life-cycle consistent with the predictions of our model is clear in the data: While in 
their 20’s male entrepreneurs are predicted to add from 0.20 to 0.35 more employees than 
female entrepreneurs of the same age. But from approximately age 45 to age 60, female 
entrepreneurs are predicted to add about 0.35 to 0.5 more employees to their enterprises than 
their male counterparts.  It is important to remember, however, that the predicted values in 
Figure 1 are generated holding all variables except age and participation in the credit program 
constant at the sample means.  Male entrepreneurs, for example, are much more apt to be 
productores, who are more likely to add employees to their enterprises than comerciantes, 
and thus in actuality the number of employees actually added to enterprises may be skewed 
more toward males.  
 Table 5 presents results of similar regressions explaining the change in sales of the 
enterprise. (Insert Table 5 here.)  The Chow tests here indicate that pooling is appropriate, 
but we present the separated samples also for comparison with Table 4.  Again the variable 
TIME is positive and significant in most regressions.  The variable CRED, the dummy for 
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participation in the credit program, is again significant and positive.  The dummy variable for 
URBAN is negative; there seems to be less growth in sales in the urban areas.  Lastly, in 
these regressions the EDUC variable, measuring the education of the entrepreneur, is 
significant and positive, especially for men.  Importantly, these estimations show no 
significant differences between men and women, with respect to change in sales over the 
reporting period. 
 The estimations in Tables 4 and 5 show the highly significant effect of years of credit 
access on both employment and gross sales for both male and female borrowers. The 
regression results suggest a positive impact of credit access on employment and sales 
generation.  Loans to productores (small-scale manufacturers) are more effective at 
stimulating employment than loans to comerciantes (retailers), as shown by the significance 
of the PROD dummy in the estimations.  However, there is no statistically significant 
difference between the two types of enterprises in changes in gross sales.  There is some 
evidence that rural borrowers generate employment and sales at a greater rate than urban 
borrowers. 
Differences do indeed exist between the responses of male and female entrepreneurs 
to credit, especially with respect to employment generation.  We interpret these differences as 
stemming from changes in the marginal value of home activity through the stages of a 
woman's life. Interpreted in light of our model, until the age at which a female entrepreneur‘s 
children are grown, her marginal value of home activity h1 is very high and displays very 
little concavity (h11  is very low), rendering the supervision of labor very expensive at all  
levels of economic activity.  For women past this age, reduced demands in home activity 
allow them to realize increases in hired labor within their enterprises equal or greater than 
 18 
that of men in the Guatemalan data sample.  These results also support the notion that it is the 
high marginal value of home time for women during certain periods of their lives, rather than 
higher supervision costs for all women, which acts as the principal constraint to growth of the 
female enterprise.   
In summary, the Guatemalan data show young male entrepreneurs to be more 
aggressive in generating employment than older male entrepreneurs, but older women to be 
more aggressive in generating employment than younger women or older men.  Job growth in 
the informal sector is generated by younger men and older women.  Controlling for other 
factors, the results in this study indicate no statistically significant difference in the ability of 
female and male entrepreneurs to generate increases in business sales within an enterprise 
upon provision of increased access to credit. 
 
4.  CONCLUSIONS FOR DEVELOPMENT POLICY 
 This research has sought to address a question in the development literature over 
whether targeting microenterprise credit at women involves sacrificing economic growth in 
favor of poverty reduction and the welfare of children.  If this trade-off exists, where 
specifically does it occur?  Our research suggests that targeting microenterprise credit at 
women, in certain circumstances, does appear to embody a trade-off of economic growth in 
favor of poverty reduction.  The empirical results presented here show that during 
childbearing years in which women must allocate much of their time to caring for children, 
female entrepreneurs are restricted in their ability to generate employment within their 
enterprises compared to other entrepreneurs in the sample.  Nevertheless, it is among 
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this subset of women for which increases in income are likely to have the greatest positive 
effect on the welfare of children (Pitt and Khandker, 1998).   
 Among women past their mid-thirties, however, this trade-off does not appear to 
exist.  The Guatemalan data show the rate of increase in hired labor in the enterprises of older 
women to be on par with those of men, although absolute increases in hired labor are slightly 
smaller because of the smaller size of women's enterprises.  Moreover, our results indicate no 
statistically significant difference in increases in business sales after credit provision between 
female and male entrepreneurs.  Thus, while the predictions of our model hold well for 
differences in changes in enterprise employment, they do not hold for differences in gross 
sales. 
 The research also suggests focusing on the sharp concavity that exists in the 
production function of household enterprises in developing countries.  It is a mistake to 
assume that sustained microenterprise financing can routinely take household enterprises 
from a size of one or two employees to a size of, say, twenty to thirty employees.  The 
Guatemalan data show that the typical case is for an entrepreneur is to move from 
self-employment or maybe from a single hired laborer, to perhaps two to three hired laborers.  
After this point continued access to credit begins to display heavily diminishing returns with 
respect to both increases in hired labor and increases in sales for both male, as well as female, 
entrepreneurs.  Nevertheless, as this performance is replicated across a large number of 
borrowers, it can result in quite significant increases in household welfare and employment in 
a given area targeted with microenterprise credit. 
 A number of suggestions for development policy flow from the results presented here. 
First, development practitioners involved in microenterprise lending schemes should not steer 
 20 
credit away from women, based on a belief that their enterprises are likely to grow more 
slowly than those operated by male entrepreneurs.  If a given region is experiencing 
abnormally high rates of infant malnutrition, for example, a strategy specifically targeting 
credit at young women may be entirely appropriate.  Second, if female entrepreneurs' 
preferences heavily favor investment in the well-being of children (Blumberg, 1989), 
microenterprise lending institutions may be able to "double dip" by targeting credit at 
middle-aged women; younger grandmothers are likely to have low marginal supervision 
costs, but are also likely to direct profits toward the welfare of grandchildren.  Third, there is 
no evidence from this study which indicates that female entrepreneurs face a disadvantage 
with respect to men in the area of income generation or in the area of loan repayment; in fact, 
there is evidence presented here that suggests that repayment rates may be greater among 
women.  Lastly, it is important for development practitioners not to become overly optimistic 
about the prospect of being able to realize soaring levels of growth in individual 
microenterprises such that they can be "graduated" into formal sector financing.  A realistic 
and worthy goal for microcredit programs is to bring about moderate increases in 
employment generation and household income, along with great improvements in the 
financial stability of the enterprise. These marginal improvements in the economic well-being 
may be enough to allow the (hopefully better educated) children of these entrepreneurs to lift 
their households into more substantial increases in welfare.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics on borrowing groups and performance 
 
  
all groups 
female 
groups 
male 
groups 
mixed 
groups 
no instances of 
loan misuse 
.73 .86 .72 .70 
propensity for 
intra-group 
insurance 
.52 .42 .62 .38 
average number 
of days in 
arrears per loan 
in group history 
4.26 3.19 4.09 4.85 
number of 
groups 
137 14 76 47 
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Table 2: Logit estimates on determinants of group performance 
 
 1 
mitigation of moral 
hazard 
 
2 
provision of mutual 
insurance (logit) 
3 
overall group repayment 
 
 
Explanation of Variables: 
 coeff.  std.err.  sig. coeff. std.err.  sig. coeff. std.err.  sig.  
CONSTANT -0.945  1.608   -2.746  1.755   13.563  5.829  **  
ALLWOM 0.793  0.936   0.413  0.804   -2.573  3.120   Dummy =1 if borrowing group all 
female members 
ALLMEN 0.497  0.524   1.307  0.522  ** -1.219  1.980   Dummy = 1if borrowing group all 
male members 
YRSKNOW -0.001  0.028   -0.080  0.032  ** -0.076  0.105   Years members were acquainted  
before group foundation 
SOCACT -0.350  0.448   -0.047  0.475   3.035  1.728   * Dummy =1 if group share social 
activities 
PRESSR 0.893  0.474   * -0.078  0.497   -3.241  1.849   * Dummy = 1 if willingness to 
pressure others to repay 
DIFFSS -1.064  0.469   ** 0.095  0.530   0.297  1.930   Dummy = 1 if members feel 
applying sanctions difficult 
MEM 0.520  0.474   0.763  0.494   -0.963  1.690   Number of members in the 
borrowing group 
CORRECT 1.541  0.682  ** -0.114  0.638   -2.833  2.275   Dummy = 1 if state moral 
obligation to repay group loan 
GTFRNDS 0.358  0.749   -0.045  0.841   -1.405  2.912   Dummy = 1 if say repay to stay 
on good terms with group 
AVGDIST -0.182  0.295   -1.027  0.375  ** 0.256  1.166   Average distance  in kilometers 
between members' businesses 
KNOWSAL 0.853  0.483   * 0.914  0.480   * -3.164  1.780   * Dummy = 1 if members know 
weekly sales of other members  
SAMEBUS -0.904  0.508   * 1.000  0.501  ** 1.530  1.850   Dummy = 1 if members engaged in 
same line of business 
OTRLOAN 0.702  0.767   -0.182  0.671   -1.676  2.620   Dummy = 1 if at least one members 
has other credit access  
YRSG 0.170 0.185  0.431 0.219 ** -0.828 0.704  Age of borrowing group (in years) 
Log-
likelihood 
-65.66  -61.58  -83.26   
 137  137  137   
* Significant at the 90 percent level of confidence 
** Significant at the 95 percent level of confidence 
*** Significant at the 99 percent level of confidence 
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Table 3: Sample Statistics 
 
 1 
whole sample 
 
2 
men only 
3 
women only 
 
variable definition 
 mean std.  
dev. 
mean std.  
dev. 
mean std.   
dev. 
 
 
  AGE     36.19 10.10 35.88 9.71 37.00 11.10 age of entrepreneur 
 EDUC   3.83 3.18 3.63 2.95 4.38 3.70 years of education of entrepreneur 
  URBAN  0.32 0.22 0.60  1=in urban area, 0=in rural area 
  PROD  0.72 0.80 0.51  1=productor 0=comerciante 
  CRED    0.79 0.78 0.81  1=in credit program 0=not in program 
  TIME  2.15 1.37 2.17 1.31 2.10 1.51 years since joined credit program 
(for credit prog.  participants only) 
FLOAN 1033 2881 1132 3311 781 1241 amount of first loan (in USD) 
(for credit prog.  participants only) 
LLOAN 1916 3366 2082 3852 1493 1491 amount of last loan (in USD) 
(for credit prog.  participants only) 
EP 0.96 1.47 1.06 1.47 0.69 1.45 initial number of employees 
ECH 0.69 1.33 0.77 1.29 0.48 1.40 change in number of employees 
SALESP 2227 3714 2244 3630 2175 3969 initial sales of enterprise (in USD) 
SALESCH 1592 5133 1697 5702 1291 2939 change in sales of enterprise (in USD) 
  FEM     0.27  1=female 0=male 
N 342 248 94  
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Table 4: Tobit estimates of determinants of change in number of employees 
(Coefficients are marginal effects, evaluated at sample means.) 
 
 
 
1  
whole sample 
 
2  
men only 
 
3  
women only 
 
4  
whole sample 
 
5  
productores only 
 
 
 
coeff. 
 
 
std. err.   sig. 
 
 
coeff. 
 
 
std. err.   sig 
 
 
coeff. 
 
 
std. err.   sig 
 
 
coeff. 
 
 
std. err.   sig 
 
 
coeff. 
 
 
std. err.   sig 
 
 
Constant -2.844 0.800 
 
*** -4.390 1.084 
 
*** -1.264 0.968 
  
-2.546  0.802 
 
*** -3.240 1.267 
 
*** 
 
EDUC  0.017 0.019 
 
0.010 0.023 
 
0.026 0.023 
  
0.019  0.019
 
 0.025 0.031 
 
 
AGE  0.059 0.037 
 
0.158 0.057 
 
*** -0.014 0.043 
  
0.060  0.038 
 
0.106 0.060 
 
* 
 
AGE2  -0.090 0.049 
 
* -0.249 0.079 
 
*** 0.025 0.054 
  
-0.105  0.052 
 
** -0.172 0.083 
 
** 
 
URBAN  -0.139 0.166 
 
0.111 0.206 
 
-0.442 0.239 
 
* 
 
-0.138  0.166 
 
-0.252 0.262 
 
 
PROD  0.986 0.182 
 
*** 0.945 0.236 
 
*** 0.513 0.231 
 
** 
 
0.943  0.181 
 
*** 
 
 
TIME  0.238 0.149 
 
* 0.317 0.185 
 
* 0.132 0.193 
  
0.240  0.143 
 
* 0.500 0.233 
 
** 
 
CRED  0.806 0.315 
 
** 0.841 0.376 
 
** 0.926 0.485 
 
* 
 
0.660  0.306 
 
** 1.296 0.491 
 
*** 
 
TIMESQCR -0.027 0.025 
 
-0.038 0.030 
 
-0.018 0.038 
  
-0.028  0.024 
 
-0.066 0.041 
 
* 
 
FEM  
        
-1.653  0.609 
 
*** -2.677 0.995 
 
*** 
 
AGEFEM  
         
 
 
0.027  0.013 
 
** 0.055 0.022 
 
** 
 
CREDFEM  
          
0.801  0.459 
 
* 0.959 0.716 
 
 
log-L 
 
-412.15 
 
-313.50 
 
-87.30 
 
-407.79 
 
-360.87 
 
n 
 
342 
 
248 
 
94 
 
342 
 
247 
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        Table 5: OLS estimates of determinants of log change in sales 
 
 
 
 
1 
whole sample 
 
 
2 
men only 
 
3 
women only 
 
4 
whole sample 
 
5 
productores only 
 
 
 
coeff. std. err.   sig
 
coeff. std. err.   sig
 
coeff. 
 
std. err.   sig 
 
coeff. 
 
std. err.   sig 
 
coeff. std. err.   sig 
 
 Constant 3.751 1.810 
 
** 2.900 2.173 
 
** 5.993 3.375 
 
3.589 1.911 
 
** 2.860 2.643 
 
 
  EDUC   0.143 0.054 
 
** 0.183 0.066 
 
* 0.053 0.098 
 
0.132 0.054 
 
** 0.086 0.074 
 
 
  AGE      0.029 0.087 
 
0.075 0.105 
 
-0.080 0.168 
 
0.040 0.089 
 
0.150 0.114 
 
 
  AGE2    -0.075 0.109 
 
-0.110 0.130 
 
-0.004 0.209 
 
-0.068 0.109 
 
-0.210 0.146 
 
 
 URBAN  -1.204 0.451 
 
* -0.840 0.543 
 
-1.690 0.941 
 
* -1.094 0.466 
 
* -1.015 0.603 
 
 
  PROD -0.373 0.448 
 
-0.405 0.548 
 
-0.652 0.839 
 
-0.450 0.450 
  
 
  TIME    0.319 0.131 
 
** 0.181 0.160 
 
0.556 0.235 
 
** 0.308 0.131 
 
** -0.193 0.546 
 
 
  CRED    1.396 0.397 
 
*** 1.281 0.456 
 
** 2.255 0.842 
 
** 1.271 0.451 
 
** 0.215 1.139 
 
 
  FEM      
      
0.884 1.417 
 
1.194 1.888 
 
 
AGEFEM   
        
-0.056 0.033 
 
-0.047 0.047 
 
 
CREDFEM  
        
0.824 0.866 
 
0.245 1.295 
 
 
TIMSQCR 
           
0.077 0.095 
 
 
adj.  R2 
 
.072 
 
.045 
 
.121 
 
.080 
 
.027 
 
n 
 
342 
 
240 
 
94 
 
342 
 
247 
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Figure 1:  Predicted Increase in  Employees 
by Age of Entrepreneur: Men and Women
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